The problem is a lack of coherence among the Afghan people.
The Afghanis are not a single people, they are a melange of major tribes of often quite different ethnic/DNA heritage and language and within any major Afghani demographic grouping there is a stasis or more often a struggle for dominance between large extended families or clans. And even within clans there is usually an ongoing struggle to determine who is the ‘top man.’
The only common factors among Afghanis seem to be Islam, tribalism and a nartural inclination to resist intervention by ‘outsiders’ who are not historically part of the land mass called Afganistan.
The only common education system historically existing in Afghanistan are the small village religious schools that educate young boys in Islam. Other than that, the average Afghani male is uneducated, truly aware of only the world of his village and tribe and inclined to act in offense or defense to protect his tribal brothers and village or to protect Islam for reasons made known to him by those who have educated him in Islam.
Hence, when Taliban fundementalist teachers tell him that the enemy are the foreigners in his tribal area or the ‘foreign’ ‘Afghan soldiers’ from outside of his tribal area, he will fight those ‘foreigners’ to the death believing that he is defending Islam and his tribal village.
So, when we try to form an Afghan Army from men coming from these villages, we are dealing with a group of young to middle-age Afghans who still think only, for the most part, in terms of Islam, their tribe and their village.
Without something that will transcend Islam, tribe and village, there is small chance that a dynamic, militarily effective and loyal Afghan Army can be formed that is strongly loyal to the Afghan central government.
The only course of action seems to be to counter the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan with demographic realities that are known to exist and which can become malleable to the efforts of outsiders. These realities include tribalism and within tribalism the ongoing struggles to be ‘top man’ and the personal greed of many tribal leaders. Its sad that we have to do things contrary to our own concepts of national governance, but this seems to be the only realistic way to bring about a situation in Afghanistan that denies the country to the Taliban/Al Qaeda.
An Afghanistan dominated by tribal leadership can lead to a sort of stasis in that country that can be influenced but never controlled by outsiders. But that influence can, if intelligently and consistently applied, lead to an Afghanistan where there is no need for large numbers of US troops. A situation that can be managed by US special forces, the CIA and the State Department.
As an afterthought. Talk about tribalism. The historic interaction of the CIA and the State Department with US military forces ‘paints a not so pretty picture’ of our own tribalism.
The problem is a lack of coherence among the Afghan people.
The Afghanis are not a single people, they are a melange of major tribes of often quite different ethnic/DNA heritage and language and within any major Afghani demographic grouping there is a stasis or more often a struggle for dominance between large extended families or clans. And even within clans there is usually an ongoing struggle to determine who is the ‘top man.’
The only common factors among Afghanis seem to be Islam, tribalism and a nartural inclination to resist intervention by ‘outsiders’ who are not historically part of the land mass called Afganistan.
The only common education system historically existing in Afghanistan are the small village religious schools that educate young boys in Islam. Other than that, the average Afghani male is uneducated, truly aware of only the world of his village and tribe and inclined to act in offense or defense to protect his tribal brothers and village or to protect Islam for reasons made known to him by those who have educated him in Islam.
Hence, when Taliban fundementalist teachers tell him that the enemy are the foreigners in his tribal area or the ‘foreign’ ‘Afghan soldiers’ from outside of his tribal area, he will fight those ‘foreigners’ to the death believing that he is defending Islam and his tribal village.
So, when we try to form an Afghan Army from men coming from these villages, we are dealing with a group of young to middle-age Afghans who still think only, for the most part, in terms of Islam, their tribe and their village.
Without something that will transcend Islam, tribe and village, there is small chance that a dynamic, militarily effective and loyal Afghan Army can be formed that is strongly loyal to the Afghan central government.
The only course of action seems to be to counter the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan with demographic realities that are known to exist and which can become malleable to the efforts of outsiders. These realities include tribalism and within tribalism the ongoing struggles to be ‘top man’ and the personal greed of many tribal leaders. Its sad that we have to do things contrary to our own concepts of national governance, but this seems to be the only realistic way to bring about a situation in Afghanistan that denies the country to the Taliban/Al Qaeda.
An Afghanistan dominated by tribal leadership can lead to a sort of stasis in that country that can be influenced but never controlled by outsiders. But that influence can, if intelligently and consistently applied, lead to an Afghanistan where there is no need for large numbers of US troops. A situation that can be managed by US special forces, the CIA and the State Department.
As an afterthought. Talk about tribalism. The historic interaction of the CIA and the State Department with US military forces ‘paints a not so pretty picture’ of our own tribalism.