On the face of it, a long war suits Russia. Both sides are using huge amounts of ammunition, but Russia has vastly more. The Russian economy is much larger than Ukraine\u2019s and in far better shape. In pursuit of victory, Russia is willing to terrorise and demoralise the Ukrainians by committing war crimes, as it did by striking a shopping mall in Kremenchuk this week. If needs be, Mr Putin will impose grievous suffering on his own people.<\/p>\n
However, the long war does not have to be fought on Mr Putin\u2019s terms. Potentially, Ukraine has vast numbers of motivated fighters. It can be supplied by the West\u2019s defence industry. In 2020, before sanctions, the economies of nato were more than ten times bigger than Russia\u2019s.<\/p>\n
Ukraine\u2019s turnaround begins on the battlefield, by stopping and reversing the Russian advance. Mr Putin\u2019s generals will continue to have more weapons, but the sophisticated nato systems now arriving have longer range and greater accuracy. By adopting tactics devised in the cold war, when nato too was outnumbered by the Red Army, Ukraine should be able to destroy Russian command posts and supply depots. Ukraine scored a success on June 30th, when it used nato weapons to drive Russian forces off Snake Island, a strategic prize in the Black Sea. It should aim to impose a \u201churting stalemate\u201d, in which it takes back similarly symbolically important territory, such as the city of Kherson, imposing a heavy price on Russia.<\/p>\n
If Russia starts to lose ground on the battlefield, dissent and infighting may spread in the Kremlin. <\/p>\n
Read it all<\/a> (registration or subscription).<\/p>\n The West can raise the cost to Russia of a long war by continuing to press sanctions and split Russian elites from Vladimir Putin https:\/\/t.co\/1hAfQ6VqmU<\/a><\/p>\n — The Economist (@TheEconomist) July 1, 2022<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n \n