The most perspicuous example of a ministerial exception is the Catholic church\u2019s limitation of membership in the priesthood to males. If a university were to have a rule that only men could serve as professors, it would be vulnerable to a suit brought under the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The difference (or so it has been asserted) is that there is no relationship between professorial skills and gender \u201d\u201d a woman can perform the duties of a teacher of history or chemistry as well as a man \u201d\u201d while the tradition of an all-male priesthood is rooted in religious doctrine. So the university would be engaged in discrimination pure and simple, whereas the church\u2019s discrimination is a function of its belief that the all-male priesthood was initiated by Christ in his choice of the apostles.
Were the state to intervene and declare the tradition of an all-male priesthood and the doctrine underlying it unconstitutional, it would be forcing the church to conform to secular norms in violation both of the free exercise clause (the right of a religion to be governed by its own tenets would be curtailed) and the establishment clause (the state would in effect have taken over the management of the church by dictating its hiring practices). (I am rehearsing, not endorsing, these arguments.)<\/p>\n
This clear-cut example \u201d\u201d to which both sides in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC refer frequently \u201d\u201d may be the only one (and it is only clear-cut because it has behind it 2,000 years of history). For the question quickly becomes one of boundaries \u201d\u201d how far does the ministerial exception extend? To whom does it apply?…<\/p>\n