The third section goes awry on the usual special pleading about procreation, including the caveat that it is talking about the “norm” and leaving to one side infertile, elderly, and other couples who do not fit that norm. The problem in this should be obvious, yet it is a logical slip made again and again on that side of the debate: you cannot argue from a norm with exceptions when we are dealing with something exceptional, and when there is an uneven application of the very principle at hand to allow some exceptions and not others. If procreation is essential to marriage, then no one who cannot procreate should be “married” (but allowed to have a “union”).<\/p>\n
The final section is the most troubling both theologically and morally. It concludes by asserting, “It is not possible to both affirm the incarnation and assert gay marriage.” On the contrary, it is not only possible, I have seen it; in fact I’ve done it!<\/p>\n