As I wonder how it feels to be that mouse, I\u2019m reminded of Thomas Nagel\u2019s famous 1974 essay, \u201cWhat is it like to be a bat?\u201d\u009d\u201d\u201da landmark in the philosophy of mind. Nagel\u2019s thesis was that there is \u201csomething that it is like\u201d\u009d to undergo particular states of consciousness or being; there is a first-person perspective (for which the technical word is qualia) that will forever elude reductionist explanation. But the inscrutable depths of a laboratory mouse or of his flying cousin are beside the point; what we really want to know is what it is like to be a human being.<\/p>\n
Some neuroscientists will tell you that it\u2019s just a matter of time before we possess a complete physicalist map of mental states. I\u2019m certain they are wrong and Nagel is right.<\/p>\n
But what is it like to be a human being? The difficulty is that we don\u2019t know which particular experiences specify our humanity; we don\u2019t whether there is some flavor or feel or \u201cpinch of existence\u201d\u009d (as William James liked to call it) that goes with being human. Introspection alone can\u2019t answer this question, for our sense of being human is a social acquisition assimilated from our parents, friends and teachers. Faith forms identity: if I accept the religious teaching that I am a creature made by God rather than a man (or laboratory mouse) produced by impersonal mechanisms, it changes everything.<\/p>\n