Eight years after the deceptively swift toppling of the Taliban, the prospects for the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan seem worse than ever. Every Western casualty, every reinforcement and every pious political homily on the “justness” and “necessity” of the war seem only to leave the mission floundering deeper and more hopelessly. Already battered by mounting casualties, Western support for the war has been further dented by an Afghan presidential election in August, wildly rigged in favour of the incumbent, Hamid Karzai. Against this gloomy backdrop, Barack Obama is faced with a request from the American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, for large numbers of new troops (see article). The decision may define his presidency. Despite the difficulty””indeed, because of the difficulty””he should give the general what he needs.
The alternative is not, as some opponents of an Afghan “surge” suggest, less intensive, more surgical “counter-terrorism”, relying on unmanned air raids and assassination. Mr Obama seems, rightly, to have ruled that out. General McChrystal, a special-forces veteran, is emphatic it would not work. On its own, it is more likely to kill civilians and create new enemies than to decapitate and disable al-Qaeda. A counter-terrorist strategy is a euphemism for withdrawal””which is what plenty of Westerners think should happen.