Few who have seen the front lines would dispute that Libya’s rebels need arms matched to their fight. But as the European powers send military advisers to eastern Libya, the developing NATO plan to help the rebels organize themselves quickly into an effective fighting force confronts their backers with difficult issues.
A survey of weapons carried by hundreds of rebels fighting on two fronts ”” in eastern Libya and the besieged city of Misurata ”” presents a picture of an armed uprising that is both underequipped and in custody of many weapons with no utility in the war at hand. The rebels are also in possession of weapons that if sold, lost or misused, could undermine their revolution’s reputation and undercut their cause.
These include anti-aircraft missiles and land mines, both of which the rebels have used on at least a limited basis so far, and which pose long-term regional security threats. They include as well heavier weapons ”” Type 63 and Grad rockets ”” that rebels have fired indiscriminately, endangering civilians and civilian infrastructure.
Forget about the lack of arms and ammunition. These are the statements that are truly important in this story:[blockquote] The rebels’ mismatched arsenal and their inexperience and lack of discipline have made achieving the revolution’s military goal extraordinarily hard.
Among the Forces of Free Libya, an absence of discipline and experience, a fleeting appreciation for both the tactical and technical aspects of weapons employment and a disregard for, or perhaps ignorance of, international conventions are all on display.
They have exhibited what seems to be a tolerance for at least a small number of child soldiers.
The rebels have little evident command-and-control and no clear or consistent rules of engagement — factors that have perhaps contributed to instances of abusive or outright brutal conduct.
Journalists have seen these high-explosive munitions fired repeatedly, and often haphazardly. The rebels firing them typically have no evident communication with forward observers who might watch where their ordnance lands, and have shown no ability to adjust their aim. In tactical terms, this is indiscriminate fire — the very behavior rebels and civilians have decried in the Qaddafi forces, albeit on a smaller scale. [/blockquote]Turning this quasi-armed mob into an effective fighting force will require more than just new weapons, and a reliable supply chain. It will require intensive training of officers and non-commissioned officers and soldiers. It will require training at several different unit levels. It will require the imposition of military discipline. Who is going to do this? That’s what the ‘advisers’ would have to do, but that is (allegedly) what they have been directed not to do.
What would actually have to happen is that the “advisers” would have to assume the role of officer and non-commissioned officer and direct forces in combat. They would have to be real-time mentors for their rebel counterparts. New recruits would have to be sent to a training program run by the advisers before the recruits are committed to combat. In other words, the advisers must take an active role in fighting the enemy and training the rebels. That’s the only way it works.
Of course, this is all inconsistent with the UNSCR that authorized the air campaign in the first place. It also dramatically increases the level of engagement. If the rebels don’t perform well, it naturally leads to the introduction of more advisers. Once you adopt this responsibility, you can’t simply walk away anymore. You are committed to victory. If that requires more soldiers, you send more soldiers. Otherwise you shatter your credibility by risking defeat.
You also become responsible for the behavior of the rebels you have trained and armed. If they do not behave in accordance with your rules of engagement, you become guilty by implication. So be careful who you choose for friends. You never know what you might see them doing on CNN.
carl