A friend serving in the Bush administration called Sunday to try to talk me out of my doubts about the $700 billion financial bailout the administration was asking Congress to approve. I picked up the phone, and made the mistake of good-naturedly remarking, in my best imitation of Oliver Hardy, “Well, this is a fine mess you’ve gotten us into.”

People who’ve been working 18-hour days trying to avert a meltdown are entitled to bristle at jocular comments from those of us not in public office. So he bristled. He then tried to persuade me that the only responsible course of action was to support the administration’s request.

I’m not convinced.

Read it all.

Back in 2002, when his reputation as “The Man Who Saved the World” was at its peak, Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, came to Britain to pick up his knighthood. His biggest fan, Gordon Brown, now the UK prime minister, had ensured that the citation said it was being awarded for promoting “economic stability”.

During his trip, Mr Greenspan visited the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee. He told them the US financial system had been resilient amid the bursting of the internet bubble. Share prices had halved and there had been massive bond defaults, but no big bank collapses. Mr Greenspan lauded the fact that risk had been spread, using complex derivative instruments. One of the MPC members asked: how could this be? Someone must have lost all that money; who was it? A look of quiet satisfaction came across Mr Greenspan’s face as he answered: “European insurance companies.”

Six years later, AIG, the largest US insurance company, has in effect been nationalised to stop it blowing up the financial world. The US has nationalised the core of its mortgage industry and the government has become the arbiter of which financial companies should survive or die.

Read it all.

A.I.G.’s financial statements provided a clue to the identities of some of its credit default swap counterparties. The company said that almost three-quarters of the $441 billion it had written on soured mortgage securities was bought by European banks. The banks bought the insurance to reduce the amounts of capital they were required by regulators to set aside to cover future losses.

Enjoy the absurdity: Billions in unregulated derivatives that were about to take down the insurance company that sold them were bought by banks to get around their regulatory capital requirements intended to rein in risk.

Got that?

Which brings us to Item 2 for policy makers. Stop pretending that the $62 trillion market for credit default swaps does not need regulatory oversight. Warren E. Buffett was not engaging in hyperbole when he called these things financial weapons of mass destruction.

“The last eight years have been about permitting derivatives to explode, knowing they were unregulated,” said Eric R. Dinallo, New York’s superintendent of insurance. “It’s about what the government chose not to regulate, measured in dollars. And that is what shook the world.”

Read it all. I didn’t catch this piece until this morning, but please note once again the absolutely crucial role of the Credit Default Swaps market–KSH

Yes, greed is ever with us, at least until Washington transforms human nature. The wizards of Wall Street and London became ever more inventive in finding ways to sell mortgages and finance housing. Some of those peddling subprime loans were crooks, as were some of the borrowers who lied about their incomes. This is what happens in a credit bubble that becomes a societal mania.

But Washington is as deeply implicated in this meltdown as anyone on Wall Street or at Countrywide Financial. Going back decades, but especially in the past 15 or so years, our politicians have promoted housing and easy credit with a variety of subsidies and policies that helped to create and feed the mania. Let us take the roll of political cause and financial effect:

– The Federal Reserve. The original sin of this crisis was easy money. For too long this decade, especially from 2003 to 2005, the Fed held interest rates below the level of expected inflation, thus creating a vast subsidy for debt that both households and financial firms exploited. The housing bubble was a result, along with its financial counterparts, the subprime loan and the mortgage SIV.

Fed Chairmen Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke prefer to blame “a global savings glut” that began when the Cold War ended. But Communism was dead for more than a decade before the housing mania took off. The savings glut was in large part a creation of the Fed, which flooded the world with too many dollars that often found their way back into housing markets in the U.S., the U.K. and elsewhere.

Read the whole article.

We’ve looked at the [Housing] bubble question and we’ve concluded that it is most unlikely.

—Alan Greenspan, July 2002

It’s a rare day when finance officials, leftist intellectuals and ordinary salespeople can agree on something. But the economic meltdown that wrought its wrath from Rome to Madrid to Berlin this week brought Europeans together in a harsh chorus of condemnation of the excess and disarray on Wall Street.

The finance minister of Italy’s conservative and pro-U.S. government warned of nothing less than a systemic breakdown. Giulio Tremonti excoriated the “voracious selfishness” of speculators and “stupid sluggishness” of regulators. And he singled out Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, with startling scorn.

“Greenspan was considered a master,” Tremonti declared. “Now we must ask ourselves whether he is not, after [Osama] bin Laden, the man who hurt America the most. . . . It is clear that what is happening is a disease. It is not the failure of a bank, but the failure of a system. Until a few days ago, very few were willing to realize the intensity and the dramatic nature of the crisis.”

Read it all.

The financial crisis that began in the United States spread to many corners of the globe. Now, the American bailout looks as if it is going global, too, a move that could raise its cost and intensify scrutiny by Congress and critics.

Foreign banks, which were initially excluded from the plan, lobbied successfully over the weekend to be able to sell the toxic American mortgage debt owned by their American units to the Treasury, getting the same treatment as United States banks.

On Sunday, the Treasury secretary, Henry M. Paulson Jr., indicated in a series of appearances on morning talk shows that an original proposal introduced on Saturday had been widened. “It’s a distinction without a difference whether it’s a foreign or a U.S. one,” he said in an interview with Fox News.

Read it all.

MR. BROKAW: The market did go up a record amount. Since 1987 it went up more than 600 points in two days. But that really is a false positive sign, as they would say in laboratory testing, isn’t it?

SEC’Y PAULSON: Yeah, I, I would say this. It’s not what we should be looking at. It is not what we should be looking at. The stock market going up and down is not what we should be looking at. We need to look at what’s going on in the credit markets, and they are still very fragile right now and frozen. And we need to do something to deal with this and deal with it quickly.

MR. BROKAW: There is a big political debate about whether, whether the fundamentals of the American economy are strong or not. Is it fair to say that the fundamentals of the American economy may not be strong, but, in fact, they’re staggering at the moment?

SEC’Y PAULSON: Well, what I should say is, I won’t bet against the American people. We’re an entrepreneurial people, a hard-working people, and we will work through this, we always do. I wouldn’t bet against the American people, and I wouldn’t bet against the long-term fundamentalists of this country. But this is a humbling experience to see so much fragility in our capital markets and to ask how did we ever get here.

Read it all. I enjoyed the interview with Mayor Michael Bloomberg also.

The market was 500 trades away from Armageddon on Thursday, traders inside two large custodial banks tell The Post.

Had the Treasury and Fed not quickly stepped into the fray that morning with a quick $105 billion injection of liquidity, the Dow could have collapsed to the 8,300-level – a 22 percent decline! – while the clang of the opening bell was still echoing around the cavernous exchange floor.

According to traders, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, money market funds were inundated with $500 billion in sell orders prior to the opening. The total money-market capitalization was roughly $4 trillion that morning.

The panicked selling was directly linked to the seizing up of the credit markets – including a $52 billion constriction in commercial paper – and the rumors of additional money market funds “breaking the buck,” or dropping below $1 net asset value.

Read it all.

Of all the points raised by different analysts about the economy last week, surely the best was Representative Barney Frank’s reminder on “Charlie Rose” that Ronald Reagan’s favorite laugh line was telling audiences that: “The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: ”˜I’m from the government, and I’m here to help.’ ”

Hah, hah, hah.

Are you still laughing? If it weren’t for the government bailing out Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and A.I.G., and rescuing people from Hurricane Ike and pumping tons of liquidity into the banking system, our economy would be a shambles. How would you like to hear the line today: “I’m from the government, and I can’t do a darn thing for you.”

In this age of globalization, government matters more than ever….

Those are the kind of words that would get my attention. The last president who challenged his base was Bill Clinton, when he reformed welfare and created a budget surplus with a fair and equitable tax program. George W. Bush never once ”” not one time ”” challenged Americans to do anything hard, let alone great. The next president is not going to have that luxury. He will have to ask everyone to do something hard ”” and I want to know now who is up to that task.

Read it all.

Bipartisan support appeared to be emerging Sunday among American lawmakers to give quick approval to a vast bailout of financial institutions.

The Bush administration has proposed granting unfettered authority for the Treasury Department to buy up to $700 billion in distressed mortgage-related assets from private firms as part of a program that Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. said “has to work.”

“I hate the fact that we have to do it, but it’s better than the alternative,” Mr. Paulson said on “Fox News Sunday.” “This is a humbling, humbling time for the United States of America.”

The proposal, presented on Saturday, would raise the national debt ceiling to $11.3 trillion and would place no restrictions on the administration other than requiring semiannual reports to Congress while allowing the Treasury secretary unprecedented power to buy and resell mortgage debt.

With some estimates that the program could involve the purchase of as much as $1 trillion in assets from private firms, Mr. Paulson emphasized that the true cost would be “determined by how quickly the economy recovers and how quickly housing prices stabilize.”

Read it all.

And that really is the crux of the matter ”” the financial system has seized up. But so far, the government’s actions haven’t helped. Letting Lehman go bust may have sounded good at the time, but it has had disastrous consequences.

It has led to complete chaos in the multitrillion-dollar market for credit-default swaps and was a crucial reason Morgan Stanley was forced to scramble to stay alive this week. It is also why questions were raised about the viability of Goldman Sachs, a firm with a pristine balance sheet and almost none of the bad assets that are bringing down other firms.

The rescue of A.I.G. further undermined confidence because, within the space of several days, the government did a complete about-face. The bailout suggested the Treasury Department was as confused about what to do as the rest of us.

So rather than help solve the crisis, the Treasury Department has actually contributed to the biggest problem in the market right now: an utter lack of confidence.

Nobody understands who owes what to whom ”” or whether they have the ability to pay. Counterparties have become afraid to trade with each other. Sovereign wealth funds are no longer willing to supply badly needed capital because they no longer know what they are investing in. The crisis continues because nobody knows what anything is worth. You simply cannot have a functioning market under such circumstances.

Will this latest round of proposals end the crisis? I know the stock market reacted joyously on Friday, but I’m not hopeful….

Read it all.

Decades of saving and hard work as a teacher earned Beverly Welsh what she thought would be a comfortable retirement.

She bought a townhouse in Las Vegas to be near her mother, but the longtime South Pasadena resident continued to spend time in her beloved Southern California. She spoiled her five cats. She took acting classes, landing small parts in a few low-budget films.

Then the bottom fell out of the real estate market and stocks cratered, wiping out a third of her $750,000 net worth over the last two years. Tight on cash, the 76-year-old retiree says she may seek work as a substitute teacher to supplement her dwindling investment income.

“It’s unbelievable how quickly it happened,” Welsh said. “I’m not sleeping well.”

Read it all.

An initial confidence that the global crisis would spare France is eroding. A poll taken Wednesday and Thursday of about 1,000 adults and published Friday in Le Figaro found that 80 percent of the French expected “a grave economic crisis” at home. Some 94 percent expected the United States to undergo such a trauma. Sixty-six percent said that Mr. Sarkozy’s government could not protect France from the aftershocks, and only 14 percent that it could.

Eric Le Boucher, an economist and editor, said Thursday that “it’s frustrating for Europeans to think they are paying for the excesses of the American financial system,” according to Jacques Mistral, head of economic studies at the French Institute of International Relations.

Élie Cohen, director of research at the Center for Political Research at the Paris Institute of Political Studies, known as Sciences Po, and a member of the government’s Council of Economic Advisers, was blunter. “There’s certainly an idea that the American financial system has gone crazy,” he said in an interview. “This has dealt a mortal blow to the timid admiration we had of the American system. But not even the most conservative French person is capable of defending it anymore.”

Read it all.

(I am quoting above from the print edition which arrived for us today in the U.S. mail. The subtitle is: They had a party. Now you’re going to pay.)

If you’re having a little trouble coping with what seems to be the complete unraveling of the world’s financial system, you needn’t feel bad about yourself. It’s horribly confusing, not to say terrifying; even people like us, with a combined 65 years of writing about business, have never seen anything like what’s going on. Some of the smartest, savviest people we know ”” like the folks running the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board ”” find themselves reacting to problems rather than getting ahead of them. It’s terra incognita, a place no one expected to visit.

Every day brings another financial horror show, as if Stephen King were channeling Alan Greenspan to produce scary stories full of negative numbers. One weekend, the Federal Government swallows two gigantic mortgage companies and dumps more than $5 trillion ”” yes, with a t ”” of the firms’ debt onto taxpayers, nearly doubling the amount Uncle Sam owes to his lenders. While we’re trying to get our heads around what amounts to the biggest debt transfer since money was created, Lehman Brothers goes broke, and Merrill Lynch feels compelled to shack up with Bank of America to avoid a similar fate. Then, having sworn off bailouts by letting Lehman fail and wiping out its shareholders, the Treasury and the Fed reverse course for an $85 billion rescue of creditors and policyholders of American International Group (AIG), a $1 trillion insurance company. Other once impregnable institutions may disappear or be gobbled up.

The scariest thing to average folk: one of the nation’s biggest money-market mutual funds, the Reserve Primary, announced that it’s going to give investors less than 100 cent on each dollar invested because it got stuck with Lehman securities it now considers worthless. If you can’t trust your money fund, what can you trust? To use a technical term to describe this turmoil: yechhh!

There are two ways to look at this. There’s Wall Street’s way, which features theories and numbers and equations and gobbledygook and, ultimately, rationalization (as in, “How were we supposed to know that people who lied about their income and assets would walk away from mortgages on houses in which they had no equity? That wasn’t in our computer model. It’s not our fault”). Then there’s the right way, which involves asking the questions that really matter: How did we get here? How do we get out of it? And what does all this mean for the average joe? So take a deep breath and bear with us as we try to explain how financial madness overtook not only Wall Street but also Main Street. And why, in the end, almost all of us, collectively, are going to pay for the consequences.

Read it all. If you want to know what I meant in my comment below about monocausal explanations, the Time Magazine print cover is exhibit A–KSH.

The lack of debt relief to the distressed households is the reason why this financial crisis is becoming more severe and the economic recession – with a sharp fall now in real consumption spending – now worsening. The fiscal actions taken so far (income relief to households via tax rebates) and bailouts of distressed financial institutions (Bear Stearns creditors’ bailout, Fannie and Freddie and AIG) do not resolve the fundamental debt problem for two reasons. First, you cannot grow yourself out of a debt problem: when debt to disposable income is too high increasing the denominator with tax rebates is ineffective and only temporary; i.e. you need to reduce the nominator (the debt). Second, rescuing distressed institutions without reducing the debt problem of the borrowers does not resolve the fundamental insolvency of the debtor that limits its ability to consume and spend and thus drags the economy into a more severe economic contraction.

So of the five possible uses of fiscal policy – income relief to households (the 2008 tax rebate), rescue/bailout of financial institutions (Bears Stearns, Fannie and Freddie, AIG), purchase of assets of failed institutions (an RTC-like institution), recapitalization of undercapitalized financial institutions (an RFC-like institution), government purchase of distressed mortgages to provide debt relief to households (an HOLC-like institution) – the last option is the most important and effective to resolve this severe financial and economic crisis. During the Great Depression the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was create[d] to buy mortgages from bank at a discount price, reduce further the face value of such mortgages and refinance distressed homeowners into new mortgages with lower face value and lower fixed rate mortgage rates. This massive program allowed millions of households to avoid losing their homes and ending up in foreclosure. The HOLC bought mortgages for two year and managed such assets for 18 year at a relatively low fiscal cost (as the assets were bought at a discount and reducing the face value of the mortgages allowed home owners to avoid defaulting on the refinanced mortgages). A new HOLC will be the macro equivalent of creating a large “bad bank” where the bad assets of financial institutions are taken off their balance sheets and restructured/reduced; thus it will be the macro equivalent of the “bad bank” that Lehman tried to create for its bad assets.

—Nouriel Roubini

When government officials surveyed the flailing American financial system this week, they didn’t see only a collapsed investment bank or the surrender of a giant insurance firm. They saw the circulatory system of the U.S. economy — credit markets — starting to fail.

Huddled in his office Wednesday with top advisers, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson watched his financial-data terminal with alarm as one market after another began go haywire. Investors were fleeing money-market mutual funds, long considered ultra-safe. The market froze for the short-term loans that banks rely on to fund their day-to-day business. Without such mechanisms, the economy would grind to a halt. Companies would be unable to fund their daily operations. Soon, consumers would panic.
For at least a month, Mr. Paulson and Treasury officials had discussed the option of jump-starting markets by having the government absorb the rotten assets — mainly financial instruments tied to subprime mortgages — at the heart of the crisis. The concept, dubbed Balance Sheet Relief, was seen at Treasury as a blunt instrument, something to be used in only the direst of circumstances.

One day later, Mr. Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke sped to Congress to seek approval for the biggest government intervention in financial markets since the 1930s. In a private meeting with lawmakers, according to a person present, one asked what would happen if the bill failed.

“If it doesn’t pass, then heaven help us all,” responded Mr. Paulson, according to several people familiar with the matter.

Read it all from the front page of this morning’s Wall Street Journal.

Watch it all and please note the reference to “one veteran Senator” who described Thursday night’s meeting as the most sobering meeting had had been in on any topic in all his time in the nation’s capitol.

Take a look.

The underlying weakness in our financial system today is the illiquid mortgage assets that have lost value as the housing correction has proceeded. These illiquid assets are choking off the flow of credit that is so vitally important to our economy. When the financial system works as it should, money and capital flow to and from households and businesses to pay for home loans, school loans and investments that create jobs. As illiquid mortgage assets block the system, the clogging of our financial markets has the potential to have significant effects on our financial system and our economy.

As we all know, lax lending practices earlier this decade led to irresponsible lending and irresponsible borrowing. This simply put too many families into mortgages they could not afford. We are seeing the impact on homeowners and neighborhoods, with 5 million homeowners now delinquent or in foreclosure. What began as a sub-prime lending problem has spread to other, less-risky mortgages, and contributed to excess home inventories that have pushed down home prices for responsible homeowners.

A similar scenario is playing out among the lenders who made those mortgages, the securitizers who bought, repackaged and resold them, and the investors who bought them. These troubled loans are now parked, or frozen, on the balance sheets of banks and other financial institutions, preventing them from financing productive loans. The inability to determine their worth has fostered uncertainty about mortgage assets, and even about the financial condition of the institutions that own them. The normal buying and selling of nearly all types of mortgage assets has become challenged.

Read the whole thing.

The head of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve began discussions on Thursday with Congressional leaders on what could become the biggest bailout in United States history.

While details remain to be worked out, the plan is likely to authorize the government to buy distressed mortgages at deep discounts from banks and other institutions. The proposal could result in the most direct commitment of taxpayer funds so far in the financial crisis that Fed and Treasury officials say is the worst they have ever seen.

Senior aides and lawmakers said the goal was to complete the legislation by the end of next week, when Congress is scheduled to adjourn. The legislation would grant new authority to the administration and require what several officials said would be a substantial appropriation of federal dollars, though no figures were disclosed in the meeting.

Democrats, having their own desire for a second round of economic aid for struggling Americans, see the administration’s request as a way to win White House approval of new spending to help stimulate the economy in exchange for support for the Treasury request. Democrats also say they will push for relief for homeowners faced with foreclosure in return for supporting any broad bailout of struggling financial institutions.

“What we are working on now is an approach to deal with systemic risks and stresses in our capital markets,” said Henry M. Paulson Jr., the Treasury secretary. “And we talked about a comprehensive approach that would require legislation to deal with the illiquid assets on financial institutions’ balance sheets,” he added.

One model for the proposal could be the Resolution Trust Corporation, which bought up and eventually sold hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of real estate in the 1990s from failed savings-and-loan companies. In this case, however, the government is expected to take over only distressed assets, not entire institutions. And it is not clear that a new agency would be created to manage and dispose of the assets, or whether the Federal Reserve or Treasury Department would do so.

Read it all.

So many foreclosed homes are for sale in Southern California that these distressed properties will soon dominate the market, forcing prices down even further.

About half the homes sold in the region in August had been repossessed, according to figures released Wednesday by the real estate tracking service MDA DataQuick, driving prices down 34% over the previous year to a median of $330,000….

“We’ll certainly see more than 50% foreclosures,” said Sean O’Toole, chief executive of ForeclosureRadar, a seller of default data.

Read it all.

From every side we suddenly hear people calling for more regulation of financial markets. The calamity on Wall Street has brought to public attention the frightening risk-taking of firms like Lehman Brothers, which lent money against assets at a rate of 35 to 1.

Something must be done! The government must put a stop to this!

But in the excitement of scapegoat-hunting, something important is forgotten: Wall Street was doing exactly what the government wanted it to do. Almost all the exotic credit instruments now wreaking havoc trace back to the simplest of all assets: the single-family home.

Insurance giant AIG, for example, held almost $100 billion in mortgage-backed securities when the market began to fall last year — and almost one-third of those securities were based on subprime loans.

The United States takes pride in high home ownership rates. Over the past decades, administrations of both parties encouraged ever looser lending standards in order to push the home ownership rate higher and higher still.

Read or listen to it all.

The wonder of financial crises is how events can move straight from impossible to inevitable, without ever passing through improbable.

Two weeks ago nobody would have imagined that, before the end of the month, the Bush Administration would have nationalised the world’s biggest insurance company, that two of the four biggest global investment banks would be out of business and that the US Government would take responsibility for three quarters of the country’s new mortgage loans.

Sadly, the events of the past two weeks may be only the prelude, not the climax, of this amazing crisis. Even the apparent rescue of Halifax Bank of Scotland may result in a bigger crisis, if the drowning HBOS drags down its rescuer, Lloyds TSB. If this happens, every big bank in Britain, except possibly HSBC, will have to be nationalised, Northern Rock-style.

The same would become inevitable in the US if market speculators who have been richly rewarded by the US Government for taking down Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers and AIG, turn their attention to the next group of stumbling financial institutions in the firing line: Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and Citibank. If any of these wounded giants collapses, the others will fall like dominoes and the entire US financial system will have to be nationalised. In a financial crisis, the impossible can become inevitable in one day, as we saw in Britain on Black Wednesday.

Read the whole article.

Last week, it was Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that needed a government bailout. This week, it looks as though American International Group and Washington Mutual will be on the hot seat. We have actually reached the point where there are now only two independent investment banks left: Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. It boggles the mind.

But it really shouldn’t. Because after you get past the mind-numbing complexity of the derivatives that are at the heart of the current crisis, what’s going on is something we are all familiar with: denial.

Indeed, it is not all that different from what is going on in neighborhoods all over the country. Just as homeowners took out big loans and stretched themselves on the assumption that their chief asset ”” their home ”” could only go up, so did Wall Street firms borrow tens of billions of dollars to make subprime mortgage bets on the assumption that they were a sure thing.

But housing prices did drop eventually. And when people tried to sell their homes in this newly depressed market, many of them had a hard time admitting that their home wasn’t worth what they had thought it was. Their judgment has been naturally clouded by their love for their house, how much money they put into it and how much more it was worth a year ago. And even when they did drop their selling price, it never quite matched the reality of the marketplace. They’ve been in denial.

Read the whole article.

The United States is mired in a “once-in-a century” financial crisis which is now more than likely to spark a recession, former Federal Reserve chief Alan Greenspan said Sunday.

The talismanic ex-central banker said that the crisis was the worst he had seen in his career, still had a long way to go and would continue to effect home prices in the United States.

“First of all, let’s recognize that this is a once-in-a-half-century, probably once-in-a-century type of event,” Greenspan said on ABC’s “This Week.”

Asked whether the crisis, which has seen the US government step in to bail out mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, was the worst of his career, Greenspan replied “Oh, by far.”

“There’s no question that this is in the process of outstripping anything I’ve seen, and it still is not resolved and it still has a way to go,” Greenspan said.

“And indeed, it will continue to be a corrosive force until the price of homes in the United States stabilizes.

“That will induce a series of events around the globe which will stabilize the system.”

Read it all.

The biggest financial scandal in American history is going on entirely unacknowledged by both campaigns, but especially by the Democratic party which is supposed to be the guardian of the little people against Big Finance.

—Ron Rosenbaum

In taking over Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE), Henry M. Paulson Jr. and the U.S. Treasury Dept. cleared up uncertainty surrounding the companies’ common stock, preferred shares, and senior and subordinated debt. But Uncle Sam’s intervention also triggered a default event, according to the International Swaps & Derivatives Assn., and now roughly $1.4 trillion in outstanding credit-default swaps, a type of derivative contract, must be settled.

You remember the credit-default swap (CDS). It began life as an “insurance policy” that big players such as hedge funds took out to hedge investment risks. Over time, however, the CDS became a tool that big funds, financial institutions, and others used as a way to place bets on whether a company would go bankrupt. They’re contracts negotiated between two parties and””unlike insurance policies””there’s no regulator verifying that companies can actually make good on the $62 trillion of swaps outstanding.

Read it all.

The London Stock Exchange yesterday suffered a seizure, blacking out as a result of a computer glitch on a critical day in the world’s stock markets. Across the Atlantic, Wall Street burst into life thanks to the government rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the companies that ultimately fund most American mortgages.
Little over a year ago, New York worried that London was set to leave it behind. These days, it is the City that eyes Wall Street with creeping envy. For America’s handling of the credit crunch has been in stark contrast to Britain’s approach. When the inter-bank markets froze last summer, the US Federal Reserve made cash much more freely available to the banks; the Bank of England, both in word and deed, was more measured. When the economy started to slow, the Fed slashed interest rates despite worldwide concerns about inflation; the Bank has held steady. When Bear Stearns faltered, the Fed orchestrated a weekend firesale; the Bank, the Treasury and the Financial Services Authority spent nearly five months reversing into the nationalisation of Northern Rock. And when the housing market and the financial system were in danger, Washington stepped in to take control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; Downing Street announced a stamp duty holiday. On each occasion, America has chosen pragmatism over principle, decisiveness over dither.

The US and the UK are, of course, very different economies. The policy options available to London and Washington differ too. But America has responded to the financial turmoil in marked contrast to the UK and, so far, with more success: the dollar has strengthened against the pound and the US has avoided recession.

Read it all.

“I think this is a bigger financial crisis…Instead of nationalizing an industry like the S&L industry, we’ve effectively nationalized the mortgage market.”

—Mark Zandi, chief economist of Moody’s Economy.com