Q: Who is the war on terrorism against? Is it al-Qaeda? Is it the tactic, which seems impossible to eradicate? Or is it Islamic radicalism?
A: What we’re confronting is an ideological conflict with an extremist world view that I don’t think is an accurate representative of Islam, but uses the language or hijacks Islam for an extremist agenda. It’s an ideology that’s reflected in al-Qaeda, and it’s reflected in Lashkar-e-Taiba, which everybody now knows because of (the Mumbai attacks). That is the struggle, and unlike the Cold War victory, I don’t think there’s going to be a wall that comes down. It will be a process of using hard power to strike back at the leaders and using soft power to change the breeding ground where people try to recruit.
Q: What lessons do you see for the United States from the Mumbai attacks?
A: Some people say take FEMA out (of Homeland Security) because they’re consequence management and the rest of the department is prevention and protection. But if you look at Mumbai, you see that’s not true. When you have an event, you have to coordinate your police and your military, and if you have fire and emergency responders, you have to coordinate those, too.
The creation of a new Department of Homeland Security, in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, was exactly the wrong thing to do. It disrupted multiple functioning organs of the federal government, created chaos, and made them less effective.
The establishment of a Department entails a huge drain on existing resources as a new bureaucracy learns it’s phone numbers, how it gets paid, where and how it gets supplies, how it talks to other agencies, what it’s lines of organization are, what it’s actual duties and responsibilities are, etc. I said when it was created that it would take at least 10 years for the new department to get up and running and actually have a chance at being effective.
To add insult to injury, the DHS was actually in the wings, waiting for a national crisis, to be established. It wasn’t really a response to 9/11. The terrorist attacks were just the pretext used to establish the DHS.
[i] The creation of a new Department of Homeland Security . . . disrupted multiple functioning organs of the federal government, created chaos, and made them less effective [/i]
No major reorganization occurs easily, but this department has suffered from poor leadership at the top. The first secretary, Tom Ridge, was a 60 watt bulb in a 100 watt lamp. The current secretary, Michael Chertoff is one of the coldest fish I’ve seen. That might be an asset in carrying out a reorganization, but perhaps he didn’t really care about administration: lots of hard work and hassles now in return for a long-term payoff. Not an optimal strategy for the further advancement of Michael Chertoff.
[i] To add insult to injury, the DHS was actually in the wings, waiting for a national crisis, to be established. It wasn’t really a response to 9/11. The terrorist attacks were just the pretext used to establish the DHS [/i]
Sounds like . . . the Iraq War.
#1, what about the idea that DHS was necessary so that the different agencies could be made to talk to each other to share intelligence and make the homeland safer?
#4 Billy,
It would be nice to think that DHS actually is doing that effectively.
Here is an article that may give both of our comments a little context:
[b]Homeland Security Boondoggle[/b]
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/01/cbsnews_investigates/main2529551.shtml
Teaser quote: “For example, there was $7,000 for bulletproof vests for police and fire department dogs in Ohio; $8,000 for clown and puppet shows performed by fire safety officials in Wisconsin; $33,000 for customized trailers to be used at a mushroom festival and lawn mower “drag races” in Texas; and $200,000 for 70 security cameras to protect a remote Alaska fishing village — cameras, the town admits on its Web site, “mostly no one” watches.”
Here is another article worth taking a look at:
[b]DHS Still Getting Up to Speed[/b]
http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/broken_government/articles/entry/984/
Teaser quote: “Despite repeated promptings from the GAO, the department had not created a comprehensive transformation strategy by its fifth birthday and has struggled to prioritize the most pressing risks to the country’s safety, both when allocating grants to state and local partners and when planning internal strategies.”
[i] What about the idea that DHS was necessary so that the different agencies could be made to talk to each other to share intelligence and make the homeland safer? [/i] —Billy [#4]
A reasonable idea. Bad execution of the idea [#5] doesn’t make the idea bad.
I am not saying that it was a bad idea. I am saying that the idea was executed at perhaps the worst possible time and has been done poorly.
If DHS had been formed the way the OSS was, it might have been a better model. The OSS was not given [i]control[/i] of other agencies, it was given their [i]information[/i]. If DHS were like the OSS with the added power to coordinate (not control) other agencies and their resources, I think it would have been up, running, and doing a great job by now. There does need to be a sort of “big picture” organization that can see what is going on “overall” (in contrast to organizational tunnel vision) and that has the ability to prioritize, allocate resources, and coordinate activities…without the hassles of day-to-day operational control. Let the specialized agencies do what they do best…just coordinated to achieve the highest priority broad missions for the overall good, rather than being trapped in their narrow tunnels of perspective.
That is my opinion, for right or wrong. Regardless, we must all now hope for the best and wish DHS every success. The deed is done. We may not have gotten a winning lottery ticket, but we did get a tank full of gas and a cup of coffee. We can move on.