Unfortunately, the core assumptions of the post-Cold War years have proved mistaken. The absence of great power competition, it turns out, was a brief aberration. Over the course of the 1990s, that competition reemerged as rising powers entered or reentered the field. First China, then India, set off on unprecedented bursts of economic growth, accompanied by incremental but substantial increases in military capacity, both conventional and nuclear. By the beginning of the 21st century, Japan had begun a slow economic recovery and was moving toward a more active international role both diplomatically and militarily. Then came Russia, rebounding from economic calamity to steady growth built on the export of its huge reserves of oil and natural gas.
Nor has the growth of the Chinese and Russian economies produced the political liberalization that was once thought inevitable. Growing national wealth and autocracy have proven compatible, after all. Autocrats learn and adjust. The autocracies of Russia and China have figured out how to permit open economic activity while suppressing political activity. They have seen that people making money will keep their noses out of politics, especially if they know their noses will be cut off. New wealth gives autocracies a greater ability to control information–to monopolize television stations and to keep a grip on Internet traffic, for instance–often with the assistance of foreign corporations eager to do business with them.
In the long run, rising prosperity may well produce political liberalism, but how long is the long run? It may be too long to have any strategic or geopolitical relevance. In the meantime, the new economic power of the autocracies has translated into real, usable geopolitical power on the world stage. In the 1990s the liberal democracies expected that a wealthier Russia would be a more liberal Russia, at home and abroad. But historically the spread of commerce and the acquisition of wealth by nations has not necessarily produced greater global harmony. Often it has only spurred greater global competition. The hope at the end of the Cold War was that nations would pursue economic integration as an alternative to geopolitical competition, that they would seek the “soft” power of commercial engagement and economic growth as an alternative to the “hard” power of military strength or geopolitical confrontation. But nations do not need to choose. There is another paradigm–call it “rich nation, strong army,” the slogan of rising Meiji Japan at the end of the 19th century–in which nations seek economic integration and adaptation of Western institutions not in order to give up the geopolitical struggle but to wage it more successfully. The Chinese have their own phrase for this: “a prosperous country and a strong army.”
Read it all and then make time to read James Poulos’ response also.
One might as well ask why are humans, humans. We sin and nations, being run by sinning humans, want what they want.
And great powers do what they want in their own back yard, unless another great power stops them. It’s not really difficult. We have been playing that game for over 5000 years of recorded history.
Of course when you lose and it’s your baby’s head being dashed on a stone, it becomes personal and no longer academic, but then you are powerless to stop it.
The Russian Bear is once again coming out of hibernation and sniffing around for things to ‘gobble up.’ Russian history has been a cyclic interplay of Russians preying upon the ‘outside world’ and Russians responding to invasions from outside of its borders.
Russia’s strong hand is its mineral wealth and its military industrial establishment which is capable within a few short years of arming a Russia bent on establishing its imperial presence in the world.
I would look first for a Russian intimidation of Western Europe, then an expansion of a Russian presence in the “cheap oil” countries of the Middle East, then the establishment of a warm water Russian naval base with a secure land link to Russia somewhere east of Suez. I would also look to a Russian re-engagement with countries in Africa and Latin America. Especially those countries which are also of strategic importance to the Untioed States and Western Europe. Russia will continue to follow its historic path of dictatorship at home and empire abroad.
The Chinese are emerging from a centuries old self-enforced withdrawal from the rest of the world. This manifested itself first in the highly nationalistic Kuomingtang and then in the ascendance of the Chinese who adopted a Marxist ideology invented in the West and modified for China.
It is hard to tell what long term forces will drive China’s long term relationship with the rest of the world. Right now, much of China is enjoying an explosion of wealth due to its rapid growth and expansion as a manufacturing and exporting nation.
However, a shortage of critical resources may result in Chinese actions to guarantee affordable and continuous flows of those resources into China. This can result in major increases in the size of its Army, Navy and Air Force.
Its foreign oil comes mostly by sea from all over the world and it could come overland from the Central Asia and Russia. It may rely more and more on imported food, again most of this will come by sea. Basic industrial raw materials come by sea and most of its foreign trade money is made by exports transported over the sea.
Therefore, it is quite possible that China may try to become a dominant naval power.
Further, when the Chinese look west across the Eurasian land mass, they see oil and other mineral resources that can be secured by an occupying Chinese army. They also see arable land, some marginallly arable, that they, the Chinese, feel that they can put to productive use in order to meet the food requirements of their people.
We are entering into a new era and the geo-political situation is uncertain, but what is certain is that we, the United States will have a weak voice in world affairs and will be highly vulnerable to self-serving military behavior on the part of the Russians and the Chinese if we do not maintain a highly credible military capability to back up our foreign policy.
And as the Red Star rises this might not be the right time for Obama.
Paulos is smart. Enjoyed his essay. Shows a cautious and clear analytical ability.