Authors Mount a Philosophical Defense of Human Life in Earliest Stages

Stem cell research using material taken from human embryos continues to be hotly debated. Advocates of using embryos maintain that at such early stages, the cells cannot be considered a human person. However, a recent book by two philosophers argues the contrary.

Robert P. George, who is also a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, and Christopher Tollefsen, avoid religious-based arguments and lay out a series of scientific and philosophical principles in favor of the human status of the embryo. In “Embryo: A Defense of Human Life” (Doubleday), they maintain that the status of a human being commences at the moment of conception.

The book starts by recounting the history of a boy named Noah, born in January 2007. He was rescued, along with other frozen embryos, from the disaster that struck New Orleans in 2005. It was Noah’s life — a human life — that was saved, George and Tollefsen point out, the same life that was later implanted in a womb and was subsequently born.

A human embryo, they continue, is a living member of the human species even at the earliest stage of development. It is not some type of other animal organism, or some kind of a clump of cells that later undergoes a radical transformation. Barring some kind of tragic accident, a being in the embryonic stage will proceed to the fetal stage and continue to progress in this development.

The point at issue, according to the authors, is at what stage we can identify a single biological system that has started on the process to being a mature human being. This decisive moment, they argue, comes with conception.

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Posted in * Culture-Watch, * Religion News & Commentary, Ethics / Moral Theology, Life Ethics, Other Churches, Roman Catholic, Theology

5 comments on “Authors Mount a Philosophical Defense of Human Life in Earliest Stages

  1. Rick in Louisiana says:

    Let me preface by noting that I was president of my university’s pro-life group for three years, subscribed to Human Life Review, participated in several Marches for Life – so don’t misunderstand what follows.

    (And I am aware this is not about abortion but about the status of embryos.)

    But in the context of debate about abortion “rights” (or rights – take your pick) both abortion rights proponents and opponents often fail to make a distinction between human being and person. Human being is a biological category (which may have moral, ethical, legal implications). Person is not.

    Of course a “single biological system” that is a human [i]being[/i] starts at conception. Duh. Now – there are a few abortion rights advocates who recognize this and acknowledge this. Too many refuse to accept this simple fact.

    But at the same time those who want legal protection for human embryos fail to recognize that just because this thing is a human being (biologically) does not automatically mean this thing should be valued and given legal recognition and protection. That is what [i]personhood[/i] is. Personhood is not inherent but is granted.

    (Theologically we might argue that it is inherent – because we are in the image of God and all that. But {a} that is a religious claim and we are talking about secular law here and {b} even then it is not being human [i]per se[/i] that grants value and status but rather [i]God[/i].)

    Now look at the article. Some say the cells “cannot be considered a human person”. The authors say we have a “single biological system… on the process to being a mature human [i]being[/i]” (emphasis mine). To argue – even prove – these embryos are human beings does not (yet) address whether they are human [i]persons[/i]. It is not a complete response. One side says “Apples!” The other says “Fruit!”

  2. phil swain says:

    #1, “personhood is not inherent, but is granted.” Well, a person is defined as a rational creature. All human beings are rational creatures by nature. So, all human beings are persons. We don’t say that a human being in a comatose state is not a person because at the moment he can’t exercise his rational nature nor do we say that a human being in the embryonic stage of development is not a person because at his present stage his innate rational faculty has not matured. I agree that the issue whether a human embryo is a human being can be answered by embryology. The issue of personhood is a philosophical issue and one need not get into theology to address that issue. BTW, Prof. George has addressed the personhood numerous times and I’d bet that he addresses it in this book.

  3. SouthCoast says:

    Since I do not know, and probably never shall know, just when the human body is ensouled, I will continue to possibly err on the side of caution. To refer the matter to embryology or some other branch of science, is, to me, irrelevant, as my objections to abortion are not of this world, but of the other.

  4. phil swain says:

    #3, since you were an embryo once upon a time, I suspect you think it a good thing that others had a worldly objection to abortion. BTW, I don’t think it’s accurate to talk about a body becoming ensouled. We don’t have a soul which inhabites a body. In fact, that mistake is quite a common error made by both reasserters and reappraisers in the current debates. It’s the mind(soul) – body dualism that has made it more difficult for reasserters to coherently make a case for their position on sexual morality. In any case, the soul is the form of the body. What embryology has taught us is that from the moment of conception a human has come into being with all the awesome faculties of a rational creature albeit in immature form.

  5. SouthCoast says:

    #4. True! However, my intent was to state that I feel no need to argue against abortion by means of an appeal to science. (Although to be perfectly honest, if not consistent, I will do so in certain other moral arguments.) For myself, I feel that it, i.e., embryology, is more of a red herring than a help. On the other hand, it is quite probably useful for others to argue, and hear, from that particular angle.