As Congress and the incoming Obama administration prepare to revamp federal financial oversight, the collapse of the thrift industry offers a lesson in how regulation can fail. It happened over several years, a product of the regulator’s overly close identification with its banks, which it referred to as “customers,” and of the agency managers’ appetite for deregulation, new lending products and expanded homeownership sometimes at the expense of traditional oversight. Tough measures, like tighter lending standards, were not employed until after borrowers began defaulting in large numbers.
The agency championed the thrift industry’s growth during the housing boom and called programs that extended mortgages to previously unqualified borrowers as “innovations.” In 2004, the year that risky loans called option adjustable-rate mortgages took off, then-OTS director James Gilleran lauded the banks for their role in providing home loans. “Our goal is to allow thrifts to operate with a wide breadth of freedom from regulatory intrusion,” he said in a speech.
At the same time, the agency allowed the banks to project minimal losses and, as a result, reduce the share of revenue they were setting aside to cover them. By September 2006, when the housing market began declining, the capital reserves held by OTS-regulated firms had declined to their lowest level in two decades, less than a third of their historical average, according to financial records.
Scott M. Polakoff, the agency’s senior deputy director, said OTS had closely monitored allowances for loan losses and considered them sufficient, but added that the actual losses exceeded what reasonably could have been expected.
“Are banks going to fail when events occur well beyond the confines of reasonable expectation or modeling? The answer is yes,” he said in an interview.
But critics said the agency had neglected its obligation to police the thrift industry and instead became more of a consultant.
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